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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 7, 2009, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak announced that
his office approved the construction of 455 new housing units in the West Bank.'
President Barack Obama responded by "insist[ing] Israel freeze all settlement
activity as a necessary step toward advancing negotiations with Palestinians.,
2
However, a halt on constructing the new Jewish housing units was unlikely to
occur, and the 2,500 housing units that were already in various stages of
construction continued despite the United States' objections
Unfortunately, this exchange involving Israel introducing construction plans
for new settlements, and the United States' disapproval, is not a new
phenomenon.4 Yet, this type of exchange is usually all that results: Israel
disregards the United States' wishes, continues to violate numerous bodies of
international law through continued settlement in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories ("OPT"), and suffers no legal consequences.
The illegality of Israeli settlement in the OPT is explained in the Fourth
Geneva Convention ("Geneva IV" or "Convention"), which is the principal
international treaty governing the law of belligerent occupation.' Article 49,
paragraph 6 of the Geneva IV ("Article 49(6)") provides that "[t]he Occupying
1. Israel Approves Construction of More Settlements, CNN (Sept. 7, 2009, 8:45 AM), http://www.cnn.
com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/07/lisrael.settlements.barak.construction/index.html?iref=newssearch#cnnSTCText.
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. Netanyahu Rules Out Freeze on Israeli Settlements, Source Say, CNN (Oct. 17, 2009, 8:54 AM),
http://www.cnn.con2009/WORLD/meast/09/15/mideast.talks/index.html#cnnSTCText.
4. See Obama, Netanyahu Discuss U.S.-Israeli Disagreements, CNN (May 18, 2009, 8:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/mideast.obama.netanyahu/index.html?ref=allsearch.
5. Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 65,66 (2003).
444
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Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies." 6 High Contracting Parties ("HCPs") are obligated to both
respect and ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances under Article
1 of the Convention.7 Today, 194 states are party to the Convention, including the
United States and Israel, and none have fulfilled their obligation under Article .s
In fact, the United States consistently uses its veto power in the United Nations
("U.N.") Security Council to block proposals to intervene and enforce the
Geneva IV against Israel.9
This Comment analyzes the legal obligations of "third states,"' particularly
the United States under the Obama administration, to enforce Article 49(6)
against Israel. Part II will provide a brief overview of circumstances surrounding
the promulgation of Article 49(6) and Israeli settlement in the OPT. Part III will
discuss treatment of the settlements in the OPT by Israel and the international
community. Part IV briefly recognizes the international community's prior
attempts to encourage, and condemn the lack of, Israel's compliance with the
Geneva IV, despite Israel's continued violations. Part V discusses the
enforcement mechanisms available to the United States, as well as the various
mechanisms available for enforcement within and outside the Convention. In
addition, this section will offer recommendations of the most effective means of
enforcement for the United States.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GENEVA IV AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE
SETTLEMENT ENTERPRISE
A. Circumstances Surrounding the Creation of the Geneva IV
The decimation of civilian populations in occupied Europe during World
War II led to the promulgation of the Geneva Conventions."l Territories occupied
by Nazi Germany saw the massacre of millions of Jews in slave labor camps as
6. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 49, para. 6,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
7. Id. at art. 1. High Contracting Parties are the states that are party to Geneva IV.
8. State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 17-
Jun-2011, INT'L COMMISSION RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party-main-treaties/$File/IHL-
andother relatedTreaties.pdf (last visited July 11, 2011) [hereinafter ICRC TREATY].
9. See Edmund Sanders & Brian Bennett, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Security Council Resolution Condemning
Israeli Settlements in West Bank, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/201 l/feb/18/world/a-
fg-un-israeli-settlements-20110219.
10. A "third state" is a state that is not a party to the conflict. See Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 2004 I.C.J. 136, 47 (July 9)
[hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].
11. INT'L COMM'N OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 5 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC].
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well as mass deportations. 12 Japanese and Russian occupation also resulted in
gross human rights violations, though narrower in scope and scale than territories
occupied by the Nazis.'" Millions of civilians were left without protection and
remained at the mercy of the enemy power, and hundreds of thousands were put
to death.'4
One of the primary aims of Geneva IV is "to ensure that claims of military
exigency do not result in the violations of basic political and human rights of the
civilians under military occupation."'5 Similarly, Article 49 was intended to
prevent a common practice occurring during World War II: occupying powers
transferring portions of their own population into occupied territories for political
and racial reasons, or to colonize the territories. 6 These transfers "worsened the
economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate
existence as a race."' 7
B. Israel's Acquisition of the OPT
The end of the Six Day War of 1967 brought Israel in control of the OPT.
8
Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria, Sinai, and the Gaza Strip from
Egypt, and all of Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan. 9 Shortly after the
Six Day War, Israel began constructing settlements in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. From 1967 to 2009, Israel established 121 settlements in the West Bank,
excluding East Jerusalem. 2' As of 2007, the settlement population throughout the
OPT was nearly 500,000.22 As of 2009, there are more than 300,000 Jewish
settlers living in the West Bank settlements alone.23
12. Imseis, supra note 5, at 66.
13. Id. at 106.
14. ICRC, supra note 11, at 5.
15. Imseis, supra note 5, at 103.
16. Id.
17. ICRC, supra note 11, at 334.
18. See FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONG., ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY 60-61 (Helen
Chapin Metz ed., 1990).
19. Id.
20. See GERSHAM GORENBERG, THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL AND THE BIRTH OF SETTLEMENTS,
1967-1977, at 99-100 (2006).
21. Settlements and Land: Land Expropriation and Statistics, B'TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/
english/Settlements/Statistics.asp (last visited July 11, 2011).
22. Comprehensive Settlement Population 1972-2009, FOUND. FOR MIDDLE E. PEACE, http://www.fmep.
org/settlement info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/comprehensive-settlement-population- 1972-2006 (last
visited July 15, 2011).
23. Chaim Levinson, IDF: More than 300,000 Settlers Live in West Bank, HA'ARETZ (July 27, 2009, 2:41
PM), http://www.haaretz.comprint-edition/news/idf-more-than-300-000-settlers-ive-in-west-bank- 1.280778.
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The settler population in the occupied territories grew at a rate of 4.9%, a
much faster growth rate than the general population, which grew by only 1.8%.24
Palestinians in the OPT also experienced settler violence." Since 1967, the Israeli
military has provided weapons to settlers who receive "tacit consent" from Israeli
authorities to terrorize Palestinians in the OPT 6 Settlers perpetrating violence in
the OPT are rarely, if ever, punished by authorities .
III. TREATMENT OF SETTLEMENTS
A. By Israel
Israel first inquired about the legality of settling in the OPT, specifically the
West Bank and the Golan Heights, in the fall of 1967. On September 18, 1967,
Israeli Foreign Ministry Officials received a top-secret memo that settlement in
the West Bank and Golan Heights would violate Article 49(6).9 Israeli officials
were advised that the prohibition of settlements under Article 49(6) was
categorical, unconditional, and aimed at preventing colonization of a conquered
territory by the conquering state."' This memo confirmed that Israeli officials
knew that building settlements in the OPT violated international law prior to
beginning settlement construction.3 Yet, despite the memo's unequivocal
warning that settlements violated the Geneva IV, Israel forged ahead with plans
that resulted in the settlement enterprise we see today.
A key substantive principle of the international law of belligerent occupation,
which finds influence in the Geneva IV, is that belligerent occupation is
temporary.32 This principle is based on the fact that prolonged occupations
negatively impact the occupied community.33  The risks of stagnation,
impoverishment, and the "backwardness" of the occupied community all follow
prolonged occupations. 4 Scholars argue that "the longer an occupation continues,
the more difficult it is to ensure effective compliance with the Geneva IV."3
24. Tovah Lazaroff, Settler Population Rose 4.9 Percent in 2009, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 10, 2010, 3:30
AM), http://www.jpost.comIsrael/Article.aspx?id= 170595.
25. Imseis, supra note 5, at 106.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. GORENBERG, supra note 20, at 99-100.
29. Theodor Meron, Legal Council of Israel's Foreign Ministry, advised the Prime Minister's Political
Secretary that "civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention." Id. at 99-100.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Imseis, supra note 5, at 91.
33. Id.
34. Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel Since 1967, Comm'n on Human Rights, N 3, 11, 18, U.N. Dec.
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B. By the International Community
Since 1967, Israel continuously denies the applicability of Article 49(6) to
the OPT.36 Close to the entirety of the international community disagrees. 3 The
discussion below lays out some of the responses from the international
community to Israeli settlement in the OPT.
1. U.N. General Assembly
"The United Nations has issued scores of resolutions affirming the
applicability of Geneva IV to the OPT and calling upon Israel to abide by its
legal obligations as an Occupying Power."38 For instance, in Resolution 3240, the
General Assembly criticized Israel's "continued and persistent" violation of the
Geneva IV through the establishment of new settlements and expansion of
existing settlements in the OPT. 39 The General Assembly also demanded that
Israel cease its settlement activity. °
A/HRC/4/17 (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Dugard Report] (by John Dugard) (noting that Israeli occupation of the
OPT has contributed to ninety percent of Palestinians populations in specific occupied territories living below
the poverty line, devastating impacts on the economy and employment rates, and an inability of Palestinians to
afford basic staples, like meats, vegetables, and fruits).
35. Imseis, supra note 5, at 92.
36. See id. at 92 (for a discussion of the various legal arguments Israel presents for why the Geneva IV
does not apply to the OPT).
37. Id. at 97 ("The whole of the international community-except Israel-is of the opinion that the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are incontrovertibly subject to the provisions of the Geneva
IV.").
38. Id.
39. G.A. Res. 3240(XXIX), 5(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3525 (Nov. 29, 1974). According to this
Resolution, Israel committed nine violations:
(a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;
(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;
(c) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses, villages and towns;
(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other
transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals
on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
(e) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the
occupied territories, and the denial of their right to return;
(f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
(g) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
(h) The interference with religious freedom and practices, as well as family rights and customs;
[and]
(i) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied
territories.
40. Id.
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2. U.N. Security Council
Security Council Resolution 465 also confirmed the applicability of the
Geneva IV to the OPT.4 In this resolution, the Council stated that all measures
taken by Israel since 1967 to change the physical and demographic composition
of the OPT had no legal validity. 2 It further noted that Israel's policy of settling
its population and new immigrants in the OPT constituted a "flagrant violation"
of the Geneva IV,43 and asked that no state provide any assistance to Israel in
connection with the settlements in the OPT."
This resolution is particularly significant because it marks the first Security
Council resolution where the United States joined in criticizing Israel.4'5 But just
two days later, the United States declared that it had intended to abstain, and that
its vote in favor of Resolution 465 was the result of a miscommunication. 6 The
United States has assisted, and continues to assist, Israel in connection with the
settlements by providing economic and military aid.47
3. Third States
In 1978, the U.S. State Department's legal advisor wrote a letter concerning
the legality of Israeli settlements in the OPT.4 The letter stated:
On the basis of the available information, the civilian settlements in the
territories occupied by Israel do not appear to be consistent with [the]
limits on Israel's authority as belligerent occupant in that they do not
seem intended to be of limited duration or established to provide orderly
government of the territories and, though some may serve incidental
security purposes, they do not appear to be required to meet military
needs during the occupation . . . .While Israel may undertake, in the
41. S.C. Res. 465, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980). The Security Council is the organ
responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It determines the existence of threats to
international peace and security, and recommends what action should be taken in response to those threats. One
of its key powers is that it can take military action against an aggressor state should it determine that that state
proposes a threat to international peace and security. See generally U.N. Charter chs. V, VII (for a detailed
discussion of the functions and powers of the Security Council).
42. S.C. Res. 465, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See MADIHA RASHID AL MADFAI, JORDAN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE
PROCESS 1974-1991, at 111 (1993).
46. Id. at 112.
47. See U.S. Census Bureau, The 2010 Statistical Abstract 29 tbl.1263 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/lOs1263.pdf (outlining statistical information of foreign
economic and military aid received from the United States).
48. Letter of the State Department Legal Advisor Concerning the Legality of Israeli Settlements in the
Occupied Territories, 17 I.L.M. 777 (1978).
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occupied territories, actions necessary to meet its military needs and to
provide for orderly government during the occupation, for the reasons
indicated above the establishment of the civilian settlements in those
territories is inconsistent with international law.49
Additionally, the President of the European Union ("E.U.") also warned
Israel that "settlement building anywhere in the occupied Palestinians Territories,
including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law".. as Article 49(6)
explains. British officials noted that settlements "challenge the heart of . . . a
Palestinian state." 5'
Despite this consensus that continued settlement in the OPT violates the
Geneva IV, the international community consistently condemns Israeli
settlement,52 while failing to take affirmative action to ensure that Israel respects
the provisions of the Convention. Discussions among the international
community regarding enforcement end in no viable plan of action. 3 In the
alternative, the United States, Israel's most powerful ally, uses its U.N. Security
Council veto power to block any proposals to intervene and enforce the
Convention against Israel 4
IV. PRIOR ATTEMPTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ENCOURAGE
ISRAEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA IV
For over four decades, Israel has consistently violated "nearly every
provision of the Geneva IV" in its role as the occupying power of the OPT.5
49. Id.
50. Press Release, European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on
Israeli Settlement Activities (Apr. 4, 2001).
51. Britain Says Israeli Settlements 'Obstacle' to Mideast Peace, FRANCE 24 (Nov. 3, 2009, 7:56 PM)
http://www.france24.com/en/node/4916744.
52. Imseis, supra note 5, at 68.
53. Id. at 137.
54. ICRC, supra note 11.
55. Imseis, supra note 5, at 68; Geneva IV, supra note 6 (some of Israel's most egregious violations
include:
(1) torture of Palestinians in the OPT in violation of Article 32: "The High Contracting Parties
specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character
as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This
prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or
scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also
to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.";
(2) deportation of Palestinians and annexation of Palestinian territories in violation of Article 49:
"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. Nevertheless, the Occupying Power
may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of
450
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Because of the length of time over which these violations have occurred and the
scope of the violations, the international community has "little reason to believe
that [Israel's] consistent violation[s] ... [have] been the result of anything other
than a premeditated and deliberate policy course, . . . protected externally by
[Israel's] special relationship with the United States.
56
A. Efforts of the U.N. General Assembly
In 1974, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 3240.57 Like many of
its prior resolutions, the General Assembly noted Israel's continued violation of
the Geneva IV in the OPT and demanded that Israel cease annexation of East
Jerusalem and colonization of the OPT.58 In the end, Israel ignored this demand,
just as it ignored many other resolutions regarding settlement in the OPT.
B. States Party to the Geneva IV
In 1999, the United Nations held an international meeting ("Conference") on
enforcing the Geneva IV in the OPT, including Jerusalem.59 The Conference was
attended by 122 participants, including 114 states that are HCPs to the
Convention. 6° The United States and Israel declined to take part in the
protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons
it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.";
(3) repeated collective punishment and pillaging of Palestinian natural resources in violation of
Article 33: "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally
committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are
prohibited. Pillage is prohibited."; and
(4) destruction of Palestinian homes in violation of Article 53: "Any destruction by the Occupying
Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or
to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations is
prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.").
56. Id. at 122-23.
57. G.A. Res. 3240 (XXIX)(A-C), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3240 (Nov. 29, 1974). The General Assembly is
the chief deliberative and policymaking organ of the United Nations. It discusses questions related to
international peace and security, and makes recommendations for peaceful settlement of conflicts among
nations. Functions and Powers of the General Assembly, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.orglenlga/about/background.shtml (last visited July 12, 2011). See generally U.N. Charter
ch. IV (for a detailed description of all of the General Assembly's functions and powers).
58. G.A. Res. 3240, supra note 57, 7.
59. Conference on Measures to Enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including Jerusalem, Cairo, Egypt, June 14-15, 1999, Final Document of the United Nations
International Meeting, 4, U.N. Doc. A/53/977 Annex [hereinafter United Nations International Meeting].
60. Press Release, General Assembly, Assembly Calls for Parties to Fourth Geneva Convention to Meet
on Measures to Enforce its Application in Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Press Release GA/9544 (Feb. 9,
1999).
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Conference.6' Several individuals, including lawyers and human rights activists,
pressed the attendees to formulate and implement a cohesive plan to effectuate
Israel's compliance with the Convention.62 One representative recommended
three levels of enforcement taken directly from Article 1 of Geneva IV:
monitoring; demanding that the occupying power respect the Convention; and,
finally, affirmative action on measures whereby enforcement would occur.6 3
However, the representative failed to clearly define these levels of enforcement,
and did not give specific details as to how and why they failed.6 4 It was noted that
the General Assembly already passed a series of resolutions demanding Israeli
respect for the Convention. 6 However, since Israel ignored these demands, this
third level of enforcement was necessary.66
The primary means of enforcement suggested at the Conference was
withdrawal of economic cooperation with Israel.67 States that are parties to
economic treaties with Israel have a legal right to condition the treaties upon
Israel's compliance with international law. 6' Trade agreements, thus, could be
amended to state that Israel may not lawfully export goods that originate from
settlements. 69
In reality, these recommendations were the only tangible, concrete
enforcement measures proposed by the Conference participants. While other
participants affirmed the applicability of the Geneva IV to Israeli settlements in
the OPT, they failed to suggest specific measures the parties could take to
70
enforce the Convention. Sadly, the Conference ended with no common plan, no
specific course of action, and no real impact on the settlement issue.
61. Id.
62. United Nations International Meeting, supra note 59, 1 4.
63. United Nations International Meeting, supra note 59 (statement of Khader Shkirat, Director, LAW,
the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, Jersusalem).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 40.
67. Id. at 41.
68. Id. at 42.
69. Id.
70. See generally United Nations International Meeting, supra note 59. Aside from the statements made
by Mr. Shkirat at International Meeting, participants mainly confirmed the applicability of the entirety of
Geneva IV to the OPT while failing to suggest actions to be taken to enforce Geneva IV against Israel.
71. See generally id.
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C. The Wall Advisory Opinion
In the summer of 2002,72 the Israeli government unveiled its plans to erect a
physical barrier ("wall") to separate Israel and the West Bank.73 The idea to
construct the wall arose in response to the dramatic increase in Palestinian
suicide-bombings in Israel since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000.74
Although Israel defended the barrier as a temporary "security-fence" within
its rights to self-defense from Palestinian terrorist attacks, this position was
questioned and ultimately flat-out rejected by the General Assembly.75 One of the
reasons for the barrier's international controversy was that it ran inside "the
Green Line ' 76 and, consequently, would result in the annexation of occupied
Palestinian land.77 The wall would also effectively cut off Palestinians from their
farmlands, workplaces, schools, health clinics, and other social services.7 ' After
Israel failed to heed the General Assembly's demand that it cease construction of
• 79
the barrier, the General Assembly proposed the following question to the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ"):
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall
being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the
report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of
international law, including the Geneva IV of 1949, and relevant Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions?.0
72. Yehezkal Lein, Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel's Separation
Barrier, B'TSELEM (Apr. 2003), http://www.btselem.org/English/Publications/Summaries/200304_Behind_
TheBarrier.asp.
73. Whether the separation barrier is characterized as a "wall" or a "barrier" is politically influenced. For
example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) notes on its website that its Board of Governors
recommended that BBC journalists use "barrier" to avoid any political connotations that might detract from
impartial reporting. Israel characterizes the barrier as a "security fence" while Palestinians refer to it as an
"apartheid wall." Throughout this comment, I will refer to the barrier as a "wall" in line with the International
Court of Justice's (hereinafter ICJ) characterization of the barrier in the Wall Opinion. See Israel and the
Palestinians: Key terms, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/newswatch/ukfs/hi/
newsid-8370000/newsid_8374000/8374013.stm.
74. Lein, supra note 72; see Martin Asser, Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Jerusalem, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 2, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 11096293.
75. See Pieter H. F. Bekker, The U.N. General Assembly Requests a World Court Advisory Opinion on
Israel's Separation Barrier, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. (Dec. 2003), http://www.asit.org/insigh 12t .cfm.
76. Id. The "Green Line" refers to the official boundary separating Israel and the West Bank when the
West Bank was part of Jordan before the Six Day War.
77. Bekker, supra note 75.
78. Dugard Report, supra note 34, [ 28-29.
79. See Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13, q 1 (Oct. 27, 2003).
80. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, HAGUE
JUST. PORTAL (July 9, 2004), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/6/378.html.
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The majority of the ICJ rejected Israel's contention that the wall was built
legally as a defense barrier." The Court ruled that construction of the wall in the
OPT and its associated regime of settlements, land confiscation, permit systems,
and movement restrictions were in violation of international law, including the
Geneva IV.82 The significance of the Wall Advisory Opinion was its unanimity
on the issue of the illegality of Israeli settlements in the OPT.83 The opinion
further demanded that Israel dismantle the wall, terminate its continued
violations of the Geneva IV and other international law, and pay reparations for
damage caused by the wall's constructionM The General Assembly promptly
adopted a resolution acknowledging the advisory opinion and demanded that
Israel comply with the obligations laid out for it by the Court.85
Of course, Israel's response to the Wall Advisory Opinion was unfavorable,
calling it one-sided and claiming it was based solely on political considerations.8
However, the Israeli Attorney General warned that although the advisory opinion
is not binding under international law,87 "the decision creates a political reality
for Israel on the international level [which] may result in sanctions."8 But
sanctions never came. 9 Construction of the wall continued and, since then,9° no
efforts have been made to enforce the obligations outlined in the ICJ opinion or
the Geneva IV.
81. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 4.
82. Id.
83. Dugard Report, supra note 34, 33.
84. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 4.
85. The resolution passed by an overwhelming majority with 150 votes in favor, six against, and ten
abstentions. The United States and Israel were among the states voting against the resolution. Illegal Israeli
actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-
10/15 (July 20, 2004).
86. See Yuval Shany, Head Against the Wall? Israel's Rejection of the Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 7 Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 6, 7 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=871927.
87. ICJ advisory opinions are just that, advisory; they have no binding effect. The U.N. agency
requesting the opinion is free to effectuate it or to ignore it. How the Court Works, INT'L CT. OF JUST.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl =l&p2=6#advisory (last visited July 13, 2011).
88. Laura King, Sharon Gets a Warning over Barrier: Israeli Attorney General Calls for Further
Changes to Route of Security Wall, BALT. SUN (Aug. 21, 2004), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-08-
21/news/0408210326_1._barrier-supreme-world-court.
89. See Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.orglscl
committees/ (last visited July 13, 2011).
90. Lein, supra note 72.
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V. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES
A. Duty of the United States Under Article 1 of the Geneva IV
As noted above, HCPs of Geneva IV have a duty to respect and ensure
respect for the Convention pursuant to Article 1.9' As the Commentary to the
Geneva IV notes, use of the words "and to ensure respect for" was deliberate and
"intended to emphasize the responsibility of the Contracting Parties." 92 The 1999
U.N. international meeting on enforcing the Convention in the OPT articulated
the duty of third states to enforce the Convention.93 The majority in the Wall
Advisory Opinion also emphasized that third states are under an obligation to
ensure that Israel comply with the Geneva IV.94 With a general consensus among
the international community regarding the duty to enforce the Convention against
Israel, 95 and an argument that the United States is in the best position to do so, the
pressing question remaining is how to enforce Article 49(6).
B. Mechanisms of Enforcement Available to the United States
There are a number of enforcement mechanisms available to the United
States. Various articles in the Convention itself provide tools for third states to
enforce the provisions of Geneva IV against other HCPs. 96 As Israel's most
powerful ally, the United States is in the best position diplomatically and
financially to require Israeli compliance with Article 49(6). Further, the United
States might seek enforcement through the various organs of the United
Nations.97 This section, however, will address the enforcement mechanisms
available that reflect Liberalism and Realism both within and outside of the
Convention. In particular, the section below will discuss the critical role of the
United States in clearly articulating the international norms Israel is obligated to
follow.
1. The Role of the Theory of Liberalism in Enforcing Article 49(6)
Liberal international relations ("liberalism") theorists argue that the domestic
structure of a nation determines whether it will obey international law.9 8
Compliance with international law depends heavily on whether the nation can be
91. Geneva IV, supra note 6.
92. ICRC TREATY, supra note 8, at 16.
93. United Nations International Meeting, supra note 59, at 39.
94. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, 159.
95. Id.
96. See Geneva IV, supra note 6, at art. 9.
97. See generally U.N. Charter.
98. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2633 (1997).
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characterized as "liberal" in identity.99 Liberal nations have some form of
representative government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and a judicial
system dedicated to the rule of law. °° Liberals propose that "democracies don't
fight one another" and thus, liberal democracies are more likely to "do law" with
one another rather than handle disputes through the use of force.' Liberalism
stresses that "liberal states will rely ... on adjudication to resolve disputes, both
intergovernmental and transnational."' 2
Rather than viewing states as unitary actors, liberals see states as plural
actors, the primary actors being groups and individuals acting in a domestic and
transnational civil society. 10 3 Interdependence among liberal states permits
primary actors to exert different pressures on national governments.' °4 Thus, the
hesitation to use force against other liberal states is even stronger among liberal
democracies that share a high level of transnational social and economic
relations.0 5  Under a liberal view, the social, economic, and political
interdependence of the United States and Israel, along with the sense of common
identity among the two states, make it likely that disagreements between the
states would be resolved through legal arenas, either domestic or transnational.'O°
a. Dissemination of the Geneva IV Under Article 144
Article 144 governs the dissemination of the Geneva IV. '°7 It provides that
the HCPs agree to disseminate the text of the Convention as widely as possible in
their countries in times of peace as well as war.'0 8 In this way, Article 144 reflects
an accord with liberalism by looking at the domestic activities of the HCPs and
obliging each of them to educate their populations on international laws. Article
144 also emphasizes that the text of the Geneva IV should be studied by military
personnel and civilians so that the rules of the Convention "become known to the
entire population."'0 9
However, Article 144 also stresses that it is "particularly necessary" that the
HCPs ensure that "any civilian, military, police or other authorities," who in time
of war assume responsibilities with respect to "protected persons," have a
99. Id.
100. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 509
(1995).
101. Koh, supra note 98, at 2633.
102. Anne-Marie Slaughter & Alec Stone, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Adjudication, 89
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 91 (1995).
103. Slaughter, supra note 100, at 508.
104. Id.
105. Id. at512.
106. See generally Slaughter, supra note 100.
107. Geneva IV, supra note 6.
108. ICRC TREATY, supra note 8, at 581.
109. Geneva IV, supra note 6.
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thorough knowledge of the Geneva Conventions."' Geneva IV defines "protected
persons" as "those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.""' Palestinians in
the OPT fit the definition of "protected persons" as envisioned in Geneva IV and
should be entitled to protection from the HCPs."2
The duty under Article 144 includes the duty to ensure that any person
responsible for "protected persons" both possess and be specially instructed on
the text of the Convention."3 The purpose of Article 144 is instructive:
In signing the first Article of the Convention, the Powers undertook
to respect and ensure respect for it in all circumstances. Now if legal
provisions are to be properly applied, a thorough knowledge of them is
necessary.... The Convention must be known by those who will have to
apply it, who may have to render an account of their shortcomings before
the courts and who, in some cases, are likely to become beneficiaries.'1
4
The Commentary to Article 144 states that the text of the Convention "must
also be widely disseminated among the [general] population so that its [laws] are
known to all those who may benefit from it."''5 Article 144's direct reference to
Article 1 makes it clear that Israel, as a HCP and the Occupying Power of the
OPT, has a duty to educate its military personnel, civilian authorities, nationals,
and Palestinians on the text of the Convention." 6 However, Article 144 may also
implicate a duty on behalf of third states to ensure that Israel fulfill its duty to
educate all persons located in the OPT, particularly its military personnel, on the
laws of the Convention. "7
Israeli soldiers and commanders are instructed on international law while
attending the Israel Defense Forces ("IDF") Military School."' According to the
Former Commander of the IDF Military School, Lieutenant Colonel Amos
110. ICRC TREATY, supra note 8, at 581
111. Geneva IV, supra note 6, at art. 4, [ 1.
112. See id.
113. Id. at art. 144(2); ICRC TREATY, supra note 8, at 580.
114. ICRC TREATY, supra note 8, at 580-81.
115. Id.
116. Geneva IV, supra note 6, at 144.
117. Article 144's Commentary notes that the HCPs agree to disseminate the text of the Convention as
widely as possible in their respective countries. The Commentary does not expressly state that HCPs possess a
duty to ensure that other HCPs uphold the duty of dissemination under Article 144. But because the
Commentary to Article 144 ties dissemination into the HCPs' duty to respect and ensure respect for the
Convention by educating their populations on the text, a fair inference can be made that Article 1 creates a duty
to ensure that other HCPs disseminate in their own countries, particularly during times of war. See ICRC
TREATY, supra note 8, at 580-81.
118. Amos N. Guiora, Teaching Morality in Armed Conflict: The Israel Defense Forces Model, JEWISH
VIRTUAL LIBR. (June 2006), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society-&-Culture/IDFmorals. html.
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Guiora, IDF soldiers regularly received lectures about international law and the
law of war while under his command." 9 Guiora acknowledged Article 144's
dissemination requirement and noted that the IDF had developed a code of
conduct that reflected a combination of international law, Israeli law, and the
IDF's traditional ethics code, ruach tzahal ("the spirit of the IDF").'2 Reserve and
regular IDF units are taught eleven rules of conduct, including the need to accord
dignity and respect to Palestinian populations and those who are arrested. 2'
Thus, it is evident that Israel has attempted to fulfill its dissemination
obligations under Article 144. However, the effectiveness of the dissemination is
hardly clear. For one, the Israeli government denies that Article 49(6) applies to
the OPT,'22 so its military and civilian personnel training on international law is
incomplete because they are not taught the full text of the Geneva Conventions.'
In addition, IDF soldiers in particular are given instruction on the ground that is
wholly at odds with the soldiers' obligations under international law and the
IDF's rules of conduct. ' Dissemination of the Geneva IV cannot serve its high
purpose if soldiers are taught to respect only parts of international law; if military
personnel are trained to accord dignity and respect to Palestinians in Military
School but given license to shoot first and ask questions later on the ground;'
25
and if the Israeli government itself refuses to acknowledge the applicability of the
entirety of Geneva IV to the OPT, including Article 49(6).126
The Obama Administration can play a critical role in increasing effectiveness
of dissemination in Israel and the OPT through articulating the international legal
119. Id.
120. Amos N. Guiora, Balancing IDF Checkpoints and International Law: Teaching the IDF Code of
Conduct, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Nov. 19, 2003), http://www.jcpa.org/JCPATremplates/ShowPage.
aspDBID= 1 &LNGID= I &TMID= 1 &FID-442&PlD=-2404&IID=725.
121. The Rules of Conduct are as follows: Military action can only be taken against military targets; the
use of force must be proportional; soldiers may only use weaponry they were issued by the IDF; anyone who
surrenders cannot be attacked; only those who are properly trained can interrogate prisoners; soldiers must
accord dignity and respect to the Palestinian population and those arrested; soldiers must give appropriate
medical care, when conditions allow, to oneself and one's enemy; pillaging is absolutely and totally illegal;
soldiers must show proper respect for religious and cultural sites and artifacts; soldiers must protect
international aid workers, including their property and vehicles; soldiers must report all violations of this code.
Guiora, supra note 120.
122. See Imseis, supra note 5, at 93 (discussing the various legal arguments Israel presents for why the
Geneva IV does not apply to the OPT).
123. Id.
124. Rep. of the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, [ 801, 803, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/12/48;
12th Sess. Agenda Item 7 (Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report]. In the Report of the United Nations
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Justice Richard Goldstone described two "policies" conveyed by
IDF soldiers with regards to protecting unarmed civilians as follows: "if we see something suspect and shoot,
better to hit an innocent than hesitate to target an enemy." The second "policy" articulated by IDF soldiers was
the setting of "red lines." Red lines are an outpost procedure, which was allegedly applied in areas held by the
Israeli armed forces after the Gaza ground invasion. "It means that whoever crosses this limit is shot, no
questions asked .... Shoot to kill." Id.
125. Id.
126. See Imseis, supra note 5, at 93.
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norms regarding settlement. The United States cannot tout that its role in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that of a "mediator,"' 27 while at the same time using
its "tremendous international influence" and Security Council veto to block any
efforts to "impose terms (or some form of censure)" on Israel for failing to fulfill
its obligations under international law.'2t The United States must make a
concerted effort to clearly articulate the applicability of existing norms,
particularly Article 49(6), to Israeli settlement in the OPT.2 9
The only way Israel will accept and fulfill its obligations under Geneva IV is
if the international community, led by the United States, clearly articulates and
accepts legal rules governing Israeli settlements in the OPT.'30 Once the
applicability of 49(6) is acknowledged by the United States-as it is already
acknowledged by the international community in general"'-the legitimacy of
Geneva IV will be bolstered by elevating it to its intended status of a mandatory
and determinative body of international law.'
32
However, President Obama has refused to explicitly state that Israeli
settlements in the OPT are illegal.3 Instead, he uses variations of the following
phrase: "the United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli
settlements."'34 By calling Israeli settlements illegitimate rather than illegal,
Obama not only downplays settlement as "merely as violating previous
agreements"' 35-he also implicitly grants validity to Israel's ongoing argument
that Article 49(6) does not apply to the OPT. In fact, the last four U.S.
presidential administrations have abandoned characterizing Israeli settlement as
illegal, while the European Union and most of the rest of the international
community has consistently characterized it as such. 1
36
If the United States simply acknowledged, as the rest of the world seemingly
has, that the Article is indeed applicable to the OPT and that settlement is
illegal,' any ambiguity about the applicability of 49(6) to the OPT would be
removed. As a result, the Israeli government would be more likely to concede to
127. Clearly, calling the United States a "mediator" mischaracterizes its role in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and its ability to pressure Israeli compliance with Article 49(6): "[It] is our intimacy with the Israelis
that gives America-and only America-the capacity to be an honest and effective broker [in the resolution of
the israeli-Palestinian conflict." See Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade? The Roles of International Law in
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 110-18 (2007) (citation omitted).
128. See id. at 115-16, n.286.
129. See id. at 118.
130. See id.
131. See Imseis, supra note 5, at 97.
132. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 118.
133. Flynt Leverett & Hilary Mann Leverett, A Road Map to Nowhere: Obama's Refusal to Dub Israeli
Settlements Illegal is Undermining Any Hope of Middle East Peace, FOREIGN POL'Y (July 1, 2009),
http:/Iwww.foreignpolicy.com/artices/20090710 l/ajlegal-mis-settlement.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Imseis, supra note 5, at 97.
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Article 49(6)'s applicability, especially in light of the "unshakable bond"
between the two nations.3 Articulating clear norms is crucial to serving as a
check on the conduct of state actors, by defining the parameters of legal actions
and warning how other states would react to particular illegal courses of action.'39
President Obama's characterization of settlements in the OPT as illegal and in
violation of Article 49(6) would remove the last remaining shield Israel has in
denying 49(6)'s applicability to the OPT.
Clear norms also provide an avenue for non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") and other domestic actors in both Israel and the OPT to press for
compliance through the legal arena.'" Because liberalism emphasizes the
importance of domestic actors on the behavior of state governments, a clear
statement by the Obama administration that Israeli settlements are illegal in
violation of Article 49(6) could provide "political cover"''4 to Palestinians in the
OPT. The United States has shown its willingness to "push back" when it comes
to Palestinian non-compliance with U.S. demands.'4 2 For example, at the Camp
David summit in 2000, President Clinton warned Yasser Arafat that failure to
offer further concessions in the peace negotiations was dangerous:' 43 "You won't
have a state, and relations between America and the Palestinians will be over.
Congress will vote to stop the aid you've been allocated, and you'll be treated as
a terrorist organization."'"
As a result of perceived pro-Israel bias in the facilitation of agreements
between the parties, Palestinians naturally fear that their interests are not
considered legitimate or taken seriously by the United States.'4 Clear expression
by the United States of the illegality of settlements under Article 49(6) could
bolster both parties' perceptions of the rule's function, as well as undermine
claims that the United States is biased in favor of Israel.
46
138. U.S. in Second U-turn Over Israel Settlement "Insults," WORLD BULL., http://www.worldbuiletin.
net/newsdetail.php?id=55619 (last updated Mar. 17, 2010, 5:26 PM).
139. Steve C. Welsh, Preemptive War and International Law, CENTER FOR DEF. INFO. (Dec. 5, 2003),
http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm.
140. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 121.
141. Id. at 119 n.299 (noting the important benefits of impartial U.S. involvement in the Middle East
Peace process).
142. Id. at 115.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 109.
146. See Russell Korobkin & Jonathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Road Map: A Negotiation Theory
Perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict After Yasser Arafat, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 46-47 (2005).
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b. Dugard's Suggestion for a Second ICJ Opinion on the Illegality of
Settlements
An additional avenue available to the Obama administration comes from the
Dugard Report. 47 The Dugard Report suggested that the General Assembly
request a further advisory opinion on the legal consequences for Palestinians,
Israel, and third states of prolonged occupation.1 4 ' The ICJ's 2004 Wall Advisory
Opinion, while an effort to clarify the legal standards governing Israeli settlement
in the OPT, had little direct influence on the Israeli government because the
United States failed to support the ICJ's conclusions.'4 9
The Dugard Report claimed that "the nature of Israel's occupation which has
given rise to the argument that Israel's occupation has over the years become
tainted with illegality.' 50 Dugard recommended that the General Assembly frame
the issue to the ICJ as follows:
The Court might be asked to consider the legal consequences of a
prolonged occupation that has acquired some of the characteristics of
apartheid and colonialism and has violated many of the basic obligations
imposed on an occupying Power. Has it ceased to be a lawful regime,
particularly in respect of "measures aimed at the 'occupant's own
interests?"' And, if this is the position, what are the legal consequences
for the occupied people, the occupying Power and third States?' 5'
Such an opinion might not only produce legal clarity on the consequences of
Israel's occupation and settlements in the OPT but may also put further pressure
on the international community to compel Israel to comply with its obligations as
an occupying power.15 However, it is imperative that the United States either
lead the efforts in the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion on this
issue, or at the very least, participate in the efforts.' The request and subsequent
opinion are unlikely to have any impact on the settlement issue otherwise."" Once
the Obama administration calls settlements illegal, Israel can no longer argue that
Article 49(6) does not apply to the OPT.' 55
147. Dugard Report, supra note 34.
148. Id. 157.
149. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 118-19.
150. Dugard Report, supra note 34, 8.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 115-16.
154. Id.
155. Israel has also argued that even if Article 49(6) applies, transfer of Israeli settlers in the OPT is not
illegal under Article 49(6) because it merely "induce[s]" migration and Article 49(6) only prohibits "forcible"
transfer. However, the text of Article 49(6) discusses the term "transfer" broadly and does not qualify transfer
with any limiting terms, including "forcible transfer." HUMAN SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, OCCUPATION,
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Along with removing any remnants of legitimacy from the above arguments,
U.S. articulation of the illegality of settlements under Article 49(6) may exert
pressure on the Israeli High Court of Justice ("High Court") to entertain suits
brought by Palestinians, rather than the High Court continuing its current course
in declaring the issue of the legality of settlements as a political, non-justiciable
issue. 5 6 As a result, Palestinians' perception of the United States, Article 49(6),
and their ability to use legal avenues to protect their rights may change for the
better. Once it is known that the domestic and international courts of law are
available and able to hear Palestinians' claims regarding settlement, a resort to
violence may be less necessary."'
c. Political Costs: The U.N. Security Council and Censure
The United States can also utilize its influence on the Security Council,
which can provide another enforcement mechanism.'58 The Security Council has
only used the term "censure" in a fairly small number of its resolutions
condemning the conduct of particular state parties.59 Israel was the censured state
in at least five of them.' 6° The word the Security Council uses to indicate its
strongest displeasure is the word "censure."'' 6' It has been suggested that a
prerequisite to censure is failure of the censured state to comply with previous
Security Council resolutions on the subject at issue. 62 That prerequisite has
clearly been satisfied in the case of Israeli settlements many times over.
161
Because clear legal rules play an important role in helping to clarify the
content and implications of international law, the United States can link censure
of Israeli settlements to Israel's continuous violation of Article 49(6) via a
Security Council resolution. 64 After the Obama administration expressly
characterizes settlements as illegal, Article 49(6) would then be elevated to its
COLONIALISM, APARTHEID: A RE-ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S PRAC7ICES IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2009) [hereinafter APARTHEID STUDY].
156. Id. at 90.
157. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 122-23.
158. Id. at 115-16.
159. Justin S. Gruenberg, An Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are All
Countries Treated Equally?, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469,486 (2009).
160. S.C. Res. 517, U.N. Doc S/RES/517 (Aug. 4, 1982); S.C. Res. 478, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug.
20, 1980); S.C. Res. 267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/267 (July 3, 1969); S.C. Res. 228, U.N. Doc. S/RES/228 (Nov. 25,
1966); S.C. Res. 101, U.N. Doc. S/RESI101 (Nov. 24, 1953).
161. Gruenberg, supra note 159, at 486.
162. Id. (arguing "Since [a state party] has already been, in effect, warned to stop its actions, it follows
that the Security Council can justify using the harsher language and censure the Entity for repeating its
actions.").
163. See supra Part II; S.C. Res. 252, U.N. Doc. S/RES/252, I (May 21, 1968). Israel previously
instructed by the Security Council to cease its efforts to change the legal status of Jerusalem through
administrative measures in Resolution 252. Id.
164. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 121-22.
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intended statute as customary international law, which the High Court and Israeli
government would be forced to acknowledge. 65 A Security Council resolution for
censure, led or supported by the United States, will apprise Israel of the
seriousness of its conduct and promote serious consideration within the Israeli
government of re-assessing its current and future settlement plans.
d. Economic Costs: Sanctions
Liberals posit that the central determinative factor in a nation's compliance
with international law is the existence of pressure from their domestic
constituencies. '66 Legal rules exert a pull to compliance because of their
perceived fairness, and can influence bargaining because of the reputational costs
of non-compliance. 67 These costs may hinder future access or threaten current
access to beneficial international regimes. 6 As Professor Omar M. Dajani notes,
third states: "can extend the shadow of international law by taking steps that
impose costs on the parties for non-compliance. As others have observed, such
steps may include withholding or constraining trade privileges, [and] suspending
economic assistance.',
169
"Many European countries, notably France, Belgium, and the Scandinavian
states, have become increasingly hostile to Israel.' ' 70 But the United States'
economic, military, and political power puts it in the best position to employ
"coercive power" against Israel in the chance that "reward power" is
ineffective.'7' The United States is also in the best position among possible
authoritative states to pressure Israeli compliance with Article 49(6). '72
Palestinians recognize, as does the rest of the international community, that no
other state has influence over Israel's activities comparable to that of the United
States, and thus appeals to other nations to impose terms on Israel are unlikely to
be nearly as influential.'73
165. APARTHEID STUDY, supra note 155, at 91.
166. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 79-8 1.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 122.
170. Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 146, at 63.
171. See id. at 56-61; see also Jason C. Nelson, The United Nations and the Employment of Sanctions as
a Tool of International Statecraft: Social Power Theory as a Predicator of Threat Theory Utility, 29 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 105, 130-31 (2005) (noting that "coercive power" is based on one party's perception that the
other party has the ability to mediate punishments, while "reward power" is based on one party's understanding
that the other party has the ability to mediate rewards).
172. See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 146, at 56-61.
173. Dajani, supra note 127, at 116.
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For Obama, an actual threat of sanctions "is far easier in regard to Israel"'74
because of the sheer number of U.S. dollars flowing into Israel from the United
States each year. 7 ' Israel received more U.S. foreign aid than any other country
in the world: $2.8 billion in 2002 and $2.5 billion in 2007, which subsidized the
Israeli economy and military.'76 The threat of losing $2 billion dollars in U.S.
economic and military aid may very well encourage Israel to comply with
international law, including Article 49(6). 17
7
President Obama could make such a threat, but the threat's credibility would
immediately be questioned. 7 As one commentator suggested:
Congress controls the purse strings, and the power of the pro-Israeli
political lobby would make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the
President to follow through if the threat fails to satisfy its objective. To
make the threat credible, the President should seek a Congressional
resolution at the time [an Israeli-Palestinian] peace proposal is unveiled
that makes U.S. aid to Israel contingent on its acceptance of the peace
proposal, thus tying Congress' hands.
179
Dealing with backlash from the Israel lobby for threatening economic
sanctions is a legitimate risk that the Obama administration must consider. 8°
However, U.S. international legitimacy will continue to be undermined if the
pattern of lopsided imposition of costs for non-compliance between Israelis and
Palestinians continues. 8 ' The United States has threatened"'2 and carried out
economic sanctions on the Palestinian Authority in the form of discontinuation of
aid and banking restrictions."'3 Even the European Union and other western states
joined in the effort to sanction the Palestinian Authority.' 4 Israel has not received
a similar threat from the United States, and the United States has not imposed
economic sanctions on Israel."'5 Once the illegality of settlements is made clear
174. See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 146, at 60.
175. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 47.
176. Id.; Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 146, at 61.
177. See Carlos Ortiz, Does a Double Standard Exist at the United Nations?: A Focus on Iraq, Israel
and the Influence of the United States on the U.N., 22 WIS. INT'L L.J. 393, 395-96 (2004).
178. Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 146, at 61.
179. Id.
180. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
113-19 (2007).
181. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 115.
182. See id.
183. Dugard Report, supra note 34, 40.
184. Id.
185. See John Quigley, The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process,
25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 73, 86 (2002).
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by the United States and it has taken the steps laid out above, attempts to impose
sanctions for Israeli non-compliance would only be fair.'86
2. Realist Enforcement Mechanisms: Pressing for Compliance Through
Imposition of Economic, Political and Judicial Costs
Realists contend that states are rational, unitary actors and that state
preferences are fixed and originate externally.'87 These state preferences "range
from survival to aggrandizement," and the "anarchic structure of the international
system," creates uncertainty such that states "must constantly assume and prepare
for the possibility of war."' 8 One commentator notes, "for Realists, power is the
currency of the international system."'89 The threat of enforcement or sanction if
international rules are violated determines the effectiveness of those rules. 190
If enforcement is dependent on the acts of individual states, the effectiveness
of international legal rules is a function of "states' relative power to sanction one
another and their respective interests in doing so.'9' Absent threats of
enforcement, law has no influence."' Thus, international norms serve only
instrumental purposes and are only likely to be enforced or be enforceable by a
hegemon possessing the resources and influence necessary to impose costs on
violators of the legal rules and an interest in doing so.193
If clear articulation of the illegality of Israeli settlements is ineffective, the
Obama administration will nonetheless have laid the groundwork for taking more
aggressive action to press Israeli compliance with Article 49(6). 94 Imposing
conditions on Israel's receipt of U.S. funds would probably be effective because
the loss of billions of dollars in U.S. aid and trade relations would be devastating
to the Israeli economy.' 95 The risks associated with a halt in economic relations
with the United States could shake up the Israeli government and force officials
to finally heed U.S. demands and stop settlement in the OPT.
186. See Dugard Report, supra note 34, In 24-40.
187. Slaughter, supra note 100, at 507.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Dajani, supra note 127, at 78.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Slaughter, supra note 100, at 507.
194. See Dajani, supra note 127, at 122.
195. Karoun Demirjian, Squeeze Israel By Cutting Aid? Not Likely, ARAB NEWS (Mar. 20, 2010, 11:53
PM), http://arabnews.com/niddleeast/article32618.ece.
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a. Judicial Costs: Internal and External Prosecution of Israeli's
Settlement Administrators
As a last resort, President Obama might consider prosecuting Israel for
breaches of Article 49(6) by facilitating criminal prosecution in domestic and
international forums of officials accused of war crimes and related offenses.
9 6
There are a number of avenues within and outside the Geneva IV. The discussion
below will outline those avenues, as well as the pros and cons involved in using
them.
i. Within the Geneva IV: Domestic Prosecution?
Article 146 obligates all HCPs to implement legislation penalizing grave
breaches of the Geneva IV.197 It imposes a duty to pursue, capture, and try those
suspected of grave breaches of the Convention. 98 Although settlement is not
expressly listed as one of the acts constituting a grave breach under Article 147,'99
settlement might constitute a grave breach as it may result in the "extensive
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly. ''2°° The commentary to Article 147 notes that HCPs are
obligated to search for persons accused of committing grave breaches.' °' As soon
as an HCP discovers that a person on its soil has committed a grave breach, the
HCP is obligated to ensure the arrest and prosecution of that person "with all
speed;,,202 "[n]ationals, friends, enemies, all should be subject to the same rules of
procedure and judged by the same courts. 2 3
While settlement may not be explicitly labeled a grave breach, conduct
associated with settlement may very well be. Settlement has been linked to the
unlawful and wanton appropriation and destruction of property not justified by
military exigency. 2" The Goldstone Report discusses the Israeli conduct during
196. Dajani, supra note 127, at 122 (citation omitted).
197. Imseis, supra note 5, at 127.
198. Geneva IV, supra note 6, at art. 146.
199. The Convention lists only the following acts as grave breaches: willful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person
to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and
regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, [and] taking of hostages and extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. Geneva
IV, supra note 6, at art. 147.
200. Oma Ben-Naftali et al., Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 551, 582 (2005).
201. ICRC, supra note 8, at 597.
202. Id. at 593.
203. Id.
204. See Goldstone Report, supra note 124, H 1569-74.
466
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 24
"Operation Case Lead" in Gaza from 2008 to 2009.25 For example, settlement
activity in Jerusalem involved the demolition and appropriation of Palestinian
land with intent to "secure a Jewish minority in Jerusalem and push Palestinians
outside the city's borders. ' 2° Clearly, intent to create a Jewish majority in
Jerusalem cannot constitute any military exigency; thus, as the report notes, the
settlement plans are unlawful (under Article 49(6)) and wantonly carried out.
207
Many other examples of expropriation and destruction of Palestinian lands in the
OPT are noted in the Goldstone Report and linked to Israeli settlement planning,
not military necessity. °8 The Goldstone Report made this legal finding:
Settlements ... may constitute direct discrimination against Palestinians,
besides causing restriction of movement, hindering economic and social
development, and access to health, education and social services. In
addition, the extensive destruction and appropriation of property not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,
amount to a"grave breach" of article 147 of the Geneva Convention. 209
Article 148 discusses the HCPs responsibilities under the Geneva IV.2 0 It
provides that "[no] HCP shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other HCP of
any liability incurred by itself or by another HCP in respect of breaches referred
to in [Article 147].,21 The Goldstone Report notes that while Israeli settlements
are not "grave breaches" under Article 147, the conduct associated with
settlement does indeed constitute a grave breach.2 2 Israel has made it clear that it
does not intend to prosecute any of its nationals, including government officials,
for the alleged grave breaches of the Geneva IV occurring during Operation Case
Lead."3 However, Israel's rejection of the report does nothing to diminish the
United States' responsibility to seriously consider the Goldstone Report's
205. See id.
206. Id. 1569.
207. Id. 1579.
208. Id. 1570-73 (noting that in March and April of 2009, 60,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem were
at risk of having their homes demolished by Israeli authorities; the Israel High Court rejected a petition brought
by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and Rabbis for Human Rights on behalf of Palestinian residents of
Khirbet Tana, effectively allowing the state to destroy all of the village's homes; new infrastructure for
settlements, including roads, tunnels, and waste dumps are being built to service the planned settlements,
requiring confiscation of Palestinians' land and demolition of houses and businesses. All of these plans are
intended to promote Israeli settlement in the OPT, and have nothing at all to do with military necessity.).
209. Id. 9 1579.
210. Geneva IV, supra note 6, at art. 148.
211. Id.
212. Goldstone Report, supra note 124, 11579.
213. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak called the report "distorted, false and irresponsible." Israeli
officials refused to co-operate with the mission or even allow the U.N. factfinding team into Israel to
investigate. Donald Macintyre, U.N. Says Israel Should Face War-Crimes Trial Over Gaza, THE INDEPENDENT
(Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/un-says-israel-should-face-warcrimes-
trial-over-gaza- 1 787972.html.
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findings, and at the very least press Israel to undergo a serious investigation of
the Report's allegations24
U.N. Security Council action under Chapter VII25 is an option should Israel
fail to acknowledge the illegality of settlements and the consequences of
settlement rising to the level of grave breaches of Geneva IV.2 6 The United
States, via the Security Council, could pass a resolution under Chapter VII
articulating the illegality of continued settlement in the OPT, and that the
settlement and occupation of the OPT has resulted in grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions,1 7 which constitute a threat to international peace and
security.28 The United States could demand that Israel fulfill its obligations under
international law by freezing all current and future settlement activity. If Israeli-
U.S. relations reach this point, U.S. action through the Security Council would
have a strong perception of legitimacy since it would have already clearly
articulated the norm and threatened to impose costs for non-compliance. If Israeli
officials failed to act in efforts to comply, it would be difficult for Israel to argue
that this act was unfair.
ii. Outside the Geneva IV: Referring Israeli Government Officials
to the International Criminal Court
a. Settlements and the Customary Norm Against Apartheid
Without a doubt, prosecution of Israeli officials inside the United States
would be politically problematic for the Obama Administration in light of the
tremendous power and influence of the Israel Lobby.2"9 Even if one assumes that
the realist approaches recommended in this section are only used after the United
States has exhausted all attempts to press for Israeli compliance through liberal
means, the Israel Lobby will stand as a formidable barrier for Obama to
penetrate.2 The International Criminal Court ("ICC") presents another tool
available to the United States to enforce Article 49(6) against Israel on an
international, rather than domestic, level.
International organizations have also suggested that Israel's continued
settlement in the OPT has taken on characteristics of apartheid.22' The Human
Sciences Research Council ("HSRC") published a study on whether Israeli
occupation of the OPT evolved into an illegal regime characterized by apartheid
214. See Geneva IV, supra note 6, at art. 147; see Goldstone Report, supra note 124.
215. U.N. Charter ch. VIl.
216. See Goldstone Report, supra note 124.
217. See id. 1579.
218. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
219. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 180.
220. Id. at 113-20.
221. APARTHEID STUDY, supra note 155, at 13.
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and racial discrimination. The Apartheid Study set out to examine the issue
presented by John Dugard in the Dugard Report, namely, the legal consequences
for Israel, Palestinians and third states if the prolonged occupation of the OPT
has ceased to be a legitimate regime . The International Convention on the
Suppression and Prevention of Apartheid 24 ("Apartheid Convention") and the
International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination 22 ("ICERD") impose a duty on states parties to make apartheid an
international crime which is subject to universal jurisdiction.2 26 Similarly, the
Rome Statute of the ICC classifies apartheid as a crime against humanity, subject
to prosecution by the Court.227 Further, settlement itself constitutes a "war crime"
under the Rome Statute. 28 Both Israel and the United States have ratified the
ICERD;19 however, even if neither state were a party to the ICERD, the
prohibition of apartheid is a customaryjus cogens norm creating obligations erga
230
omnes.
"To assess whether the State of Israel is practicing apartheid in the occupied
Palestinian Territory," the HSRC looked at the definition of apartheid as defined
in the Apartheid Convention.2 1' The Apartheid Study found that Israel attempted
to consolidate the presence of settlers in various parts of the OPT, which is not
"simply the pursuit of an improper purpose, it is the pursuit of an illegal purpose
[in violation of Article 49(6)], and ... one pursued knowingly from the start of
the settlement process. '232  Further, the Apartheid Study rejects the Israeli
argument that discriminatory treatment of the Palestinians is not racially
motivated but based purely on citizenship.233 Under Israeli law, "Palestinian
refugees from within the Green Line and living in the OPT would not be
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30,
1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18, 1976) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].
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signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD].
226. APARTHEID STUDY, supra note 155, at 49.
227. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(j), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
32/A/Conf. 183/9, 37 I.L.M 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
228. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
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prevented from returning to Israel and obtaining Israeli citizenship if they were
Jews." '234 Long-term residents are allegedly denied citizenship on the grounds of
235their race, ethnicity, or descent group.
These findings are just a few of the many included in the Apartheid Study
indicating that Israeli occupation in the OPT is no longer legitimate, and
occupation and settlement has acquired features of apartheid that must be
addressed by Israel and the international community. This study culminated
with recommendations that the General Assembly request an advisory opinion on
the legal consequences of the prolonged occupation as advised by the Dugard
Report, and that third states "not . . . recogni[z]e as lawful the illegal situation
created by Israel's practices of ... apartheid in the OPT" and "cooperate with a
view to bringing the illegal situation to an end.,
237
238Because neither the United States nor Israel ratified the Rome Statute, the
United States would have to refer Israeli government officials to the Prosecutor
of the ICC via a Chapter VII Security Council resolution pursuant to Article
13(b) of the Rome Statute.239 Since the United States is probably the only member
of the Security Council today who would veto a Security Council referral of
Israeli officials to the ICC, having the United States initiate and back the referral
should ensure that it reaches the ICC without a veto from any other member of
the permanent five. Referral by the United States via the Security Council would
provide an incentive to Israel to comply with Article 49(6). 240 Failure to comply
would not only risk Israel losing its strongest ally and primary source of
international aid, but also expose its government officials to penal sanctions.24'
Aside from the political backlash stemming from the Israel Lobby, another
impediment to the United States seeking enforcement of Article 49(6) against
Israel through the ICC is the United States' own self-interest. 242 The ICC's central
purpose, to end impunity for those who commit mass atrocities, reflects U.S.
values. 243 Yet, the United States is in opposition to the ICC.2 A The primary
concern the U.S. Government expressed about the ICC is its jurisdictional
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 294.
238. Coal. for the Int'l Criminal Court, The Rome Statute in the World, ICCNOW.ORG,
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Signatures-
NonSignatures andRatifications of theRSintheWorldNovember_2009.pdf (last visited July 13, 2011).
239. See Rome Statute, supra note 227, at art. 13(b).
240. See id.
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242. See SARAH B. SEWALL & CARL KAYSEN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 1-4 (2000).
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id. at 1-4.
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elements.2 45 The bulk of the ICC's substantive statutes laying out the elements of
particular war crimes were overwhelmingly influenced by the United States. 46
However, U.S. officials refuse to become a signatory to the ICC until the
ICC's jurisdiction is reformed.2 47 The U.S. Government feared that states party to
the Rome Statute would use the ICC as a means of challenging U.S. foreign
policy, or worse, as an avenue for hostile states to target the United States
through prosecution of American citizens. 2 8 As a result, the United States made it
clear that it would not become a party to the Rome Statute unless an exemption
was made for prosecution of Americans. 24' Naturally, this was not politically
feasible since no other state party would have the same exemption made
available for its nationals,250 and otherwise the whole foundation of the ICC
would crumble and leave no incentive for any state to become a signatory.25'
Finally, there is the issue of how to choose which Israeli officials to
prosecute. President Obama would need to select Israeli officials that develop
and administer Israel's settlement policy in the OPT, and refer those specific
individuals to the ICC for prosecution.2 52 Thus, while referral to the ICC is a tool
available to the United States to enforce Article 49(6) against Israel, it does not
seem to offer the best solution, particularly since neither Israel nor the United
States is a party to the Rome Statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
After over forty years of occupation and settlement in the OPT, Israel was
bound to engage in activity that would produce negative effects on Palestinians
and subject the state to overwhelming criticism from its nationals and third states.
However, Israeli settlements have gone beyond a mere breach of Article 49(6) by
acquiring features of apartheid, and possibly rendering its entire occupation
regime illegal. 53 The United States, as Israel's closest and most powerful ally,
must change its approach. It cannot continue to shield Israel from both
international and domestic calls for the government to comply with its obligation
under Article 49(6) to cease settlement in the OPT and yet expect finality to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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It is well established that the United States is the key authoritative power in
the conflict. 25 Intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations primarily
cite the legal norms with respect to Israel but cannot move beyond this type of
citation without the backing of the United States.255 Moreover, if the Obama
administration cannot even declare settlements illegal,2 6 then it is impossible to
conclude that the United States is living up to its legal duty to press Israeli
compliance with Article 49(6). The United States faces more criticism today than
it has in prior years from international actors for its unwillingness to articulate
the legal rules governing Israeli settlements.25 7 U.S. legitimacy is being
questioned and undermined and will continue to be if the United States does not
act on its duty under Article 1. If liberal approaches are ineffective, realist
mechanisms are available to the Obama administration and should be employed,
if for no other reason than to protect the United States' position relative to the
rest of the world. Israel must be subjected to costs, the same costs imposed on the
Palestinian Authority and Hamas, before Israel will act. If the imposition of costs
is not led by, or at least joined in by, the United States, then the world may not
see an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for another forty years.
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